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Abstract The recent withdrawal of Cox-2 Inhibitors has generated debate on
the role of information in drug diffusion: can the market learn the efficacy
of new drugs, or does it depend solely on manufacturer advertising and FDA
updates? In this study, we use a novel data set to study the role of learning
in the diffusion of three Cox-2 Inhibitors—Celebrex, Vioxx and Bextra—
before the Vioxx withdrawal. Our study has two unique features: first, we
observe each patient’s reported satisfaction after consuming a drug. This
patient level data set, together with market level data on FDA updates,
media coverage, academic articles, and pharmaceutical advertising, allows
us to model individual prescription decisions. Second, we distinguish across-
patient learning of a drug’s general efficacy from the within-patient learning of
the match between a drug and a patient. Our results suggest that prescription
choice is sensitive to many sources of information. At the beginning of 2001
and upon Bextra entry in January 2002, doctors held a strong prior belief
about the efficacy of Celebrex, Vioxx, and Bextra. As a result, the learning
from patient satisfaction is gradual and more concentrated on drug-patient
P. K. Chintagunta
Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
e-mail: pradeep.chintagunta@ChicagoBooth.edu
R. Jiang (B)
Graduate School of Management, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA, USA
e-mail: rejiang@ucdavis.edu
G. Z. Jin
Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
e-mail: jin@econ.umd.edu
G. Z. Jin
NBER, Cambridge, MA, USA
400 P.K. Chintagunta et al.
match than on across-patient spillovers. News articles are weakly beneficial for
Cox-2 drug sales, but academic articles appear to be detrimental. The impact
of FDA updates is close to zero once we control for academic articles, which
suggests that FDA updates follow academic articles and therefore deliver little
new information to doctors. Two counterfactual experiments are carried out
to quantify the influence of information on market shares.
Keywords Learning · Drug diffusion · Prescription choice ·
Patient satisfaction
JEL Classifications D8 · I1 · M3 · C5
1 Introduction
Once a prescription drug is approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the market will generate thousands or even millions of instances of
that drug’s use in a short period of time. Can the market learn the efficacy
and safety of new drugs, or does it solely depend on manufacturer advertising
and FDA updates? This question is not only important for the everyday
practice of prescribing, it also determines the optimal design of the FDA’s
post-marketing surveillance system, which is under intensive debate given the
recent withdrawal of blockbuster drugs. In this paper, we use a novel data set
to quantify how a doctor learns from patient experience, while controlling for
other information channels including manufacturer advertising, FDA updates,
and published articles.
In particular, we distinguish two types of physician learning: when a patient
reports her drug use experience to a doctor, the reported information may
reflect the drug’s average quality or the patient’s idiosyncratic match with the
drug. The main task of the doctor is to decipher these two components as the
former is applicable to all patients but the latter is only useful for the reporting
patient. Throughout the paper, we label the learning of a drug’s average quality
as across-patient learning and the learning of a patient-drug match as within-
patient learning.
Existing studies have focused on either across-patient learning (Ching 2005;
Coscelli and Shum 2004; Narayanan et al. 2005) or within-patient learning
(Crawford and Shum 2005) but not both. We believe the two types of learning
are linked: doctors are not only uncertain about the average quality of a
drug, they also have imperfect information on the specific match between
a drug and a patient. Both uncertainties are embodied in one single report
of patient satisfaction, hence ignoring any one of them is likely to introduce
estimation bias in a model that accounts only for one of the two effects. In the
model specified below, we show how across- and within-patient learning are
mathematically linked in a Bayesian updating process.
Our empirical analysis focuses on Cox-2 Inhibitors, a new class of pain
killers that underwent dramatic changes in a period of 6 years. Cox-2 Inhibitors
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belong to a broader class of drugs called non-steroidal anti-inflammatory
drugs (NSAIDs). Prior to the introduction of Cox-2 Inhibitors, patients typ-
ically were treated with traditional NSAIDs medication. Between 1998 and
2001, the FDA approved three Cyclooxygenase-2 (Cox-2) Inhibitors: Celebrex
(Dec. 1998), Vioxx (May. 1999), and Bextra (Nov. 2001). All of them were
heavily advertised as safer alternatives to then existing pain killers. By
September 2004, the class had more than 10 million patients, annual sales had
reached $6 billion in 2003, and total advertising dollars spent in 2003 were
as high as $400 million. After a clinical trial associated Vioxx with severe
cardiovascular (CV) risks, Merck withdrew the blockbuster drug in September
2004. CV risks and enhanced concerns on skin irritation led to the withdrawal
of Bextra in April 2005. As of today, Celebrex is the only Cox-2 Inhibitor
remaining on the market, with warnings added in April 2005.
Because the Vioxx withdrawal is likely to raise concerns about the other
Cox-2 inhibitors,1 we believe the role of information has changed dramatically
before and after the Vioxx withdrawal. To better characterize the learning
of new drugs, this paper focuses on the prescription decisions made before
the end of 2003. The nine-month lag between the end of 2003 and the Vioxx
withdrawal should be long enough to avoid any contamination from the
withdrawal decision.
To empirically distinguish across- and within-patient learning, we use a
unique data set obtained from a marketing research company, IPSOS. IP-
SOS tracked a nationally representative sample of patients from 1999 to
2005. Not only did IPSOS report every NSAIDs prescription received by
the sampled patients (including traditional NSAIDs and Cox-2s), it started
to keep a longitudinal record of patient satisfaction with these prescriptions
from January 2001. These satisfaction measures, together with FDA updates,
media coverage, academic articles, and manufacturer advertising, allow us to
associate individual prescriptions with various sources of information.
Note that information content may differ across sources: for example, heart
attack is rare and often urgent when it occurs. Patients that suffered from such
an adverse event may not have time and opportunity to report this in the next
doctor’s visit. However, these events may be reviewed in an article published
later on in the mass media or in academic journals. The accumulation of
such events may also lead to some FDA actions. In comparison, minor side
effects such as stomach upset and skin rash are noticeable to individual patients
and are more likely incorporated in their satisfaction report. These potential
differences motivate us to treat each information source differently.
Compared with the existing literature, our data are better-suited to mod-
eling the across- and within-patient learning because we observe patients’
satisfaction signals. Equipped with the patient satisfaction data, we assume
doctors held a prior belief about Cox-2 inhibitors at the end of 2000, which
summarizes all the information up to 2000. Starting Jan. 2001, doctors received
1The first official claim of CV risks being a class effect was documented by FDA in April 2005.
402 P.K. Chintagunta et al.
patient satisfaction information on a daily basis and used them to form
posterior beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. To our knowledge, all the existing
studies on drug learning have no direct panel data on patient feedback signals.
Instead, authors assume that the unobserved signals conform to a given, i.e.,
assumed, statistical distribution. They then model prescription choice as a
result of random draws from that distribution. Since we observe the realization
of feedback signals, we can (a) impose fewer identification restrictions, (b)
eliminate the computational burden of using simulation to integrate out the
unobserved signals; and (c) make the model more parsimonious by eliminating
the need to estimate the true drug qualities.
Despite the benefits associated with our data, they are still imperfect for
integrating across- and within-patient learning because we do not observe
physician identities. Thus, we need to make assumptions on the mechanism
by which information is shared across patients. In particular, we assume that
doctors in the same geographic area (in our case, census division) exchange
opinions and learn from each others’ patients’ experiences. Since we do not
observe physician identities, one can also think of this as assuming that patients
directly share information and learn from each other’s satisfaction within a
geographic area. To mitigate the effect of arbitrary assumptions regarding the
geographic area of information exchange, we investigate the scope of infor-
mation pooling by changing the definition of geographic area and assessing
model fit.
Our second contribution to the literature lies in collecting factors other
than patient satisfaction that could potentially influence a doctor’s prescription
decision. Specifically, we allow FDA updates, manufacturer advertising,2 news
reports and academic articles to enter the utility function directly and therefore
influence doctors’ relative preference across drugs.3 These data allow us to
distinguish the impact of patient satisfaction from other factors.
Our results suggest that prescription choice is sensitive to many factors. At
the beginning of 2001 and upon the Bextra entry in January 2002, doctors held
a strong prior belief about the efficacy of Celebrex, Vioxx, and Bextra. As a
result, the learning from patient satisfaction is gradual and more concentrated
on drug-patient match than on across-patient spillovers. We also find that
advertising and news articles are positively correlated with drug sales but
academic articles appear to be detrimental. The impact of FDA updates is
close to zero once we control for academic articles, which suggests that FDA
updates follow academic articles and therefore deliver little news to doctors.
To better understand the relative importance of patient satisfaction versus
academic articles, we conduct two counterfactual experiments: one expands
the sharing of patient satisfaction from census division to nationwide, and the
2Which includes detailing, direct-to-consumer advertising, and journal advertising.
3These factors are too lumpy (i.e., only observed at the aggregate market level) relative to the
patient level prescription data to accurately identify learning from these sources in a Bayesian
updating framework. For more details please see Section 4.
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other doubles the counts of academic publications. Both experiments attempt
to capture the spirit of existing proposals for the reform of the FDA’s post-
marketing surveillance.
For example, Slater (2005) has urged the FDA to set up a nationwide data-
base (via computer-assisted prescribing of bar-coded medications) to establish
a rapid link between an event and prescription. In fact, private efforts such as
Sermo.com has already facilitated nationwide sharing of patient experience
among doctors. In a more comprehensive proposal, Ray and Stein (2006)
suggest setting up the Center for Drug Information, which “coordinates the
communication of accurate, unbiased information to practitioners and patients
that promotes the use of drugs in accordance with the best available data.”
They argue that third parties such as academia have much less conflict of in-
terest (than drug manufacturers) in marketing and could improve prescription
practice by academic detailing. Indeed, the medical literature has proven the
effectiveness of academic detailing which involves the face-to-face education
of prescribers by pharmacists, physicians and nurses who are not compensated
by the pharmaceutical company. It also involves mailing doctors a series of
“unadvertisements” based on academic findings (Avorn and Soumerai 1983).
Though doubling the count of academic publications is less realistic than
the existing methods of academic detailing, it helps us quantify the effect of
academic detailing and compare it directly to nationwide sharing of patient
satisfaction.
The counterfactual predictions suggest that setting up a nationwide data-
base of patient feedback encourages doctors to switch from traditional
NSAIDs to Cox-2s, but increasing academic publications about Cox-2s steers
market share away from Cox-2s. This suggests that patient feedback and
academic articles may reflect different dimensions of drug quality, and hence
do not substitute for each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides detailed
information on the background of Cox-2 Inhibitors. Section 3 describes and
summarizes the data. Section 4 presents the econometric model. In Section 5,
we report empirical estimates, discuss robustness checks, and perform coun-
terfactual predictions. Conclusions are offered in Section 6.
2 Background
Cox-2 Inhibitors were initially introduced to reduce the gastrointestinal (GI)
risks of conventional non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) while
maintaining the same efficacy in pain relief. Traditional NSAIDs, such as
Aspirin, ibuprofen (Motrin) and naproxen (Naprosyn), block Cox-1 and
Cox-2 enzymes and therefore impede the production of the chemical mes-
sengers (prostaglandins) that cause inflammation. However, since some
Cox-1 enzyme exists in the stomach and its production of chemical messengers
protects the inner stomach, blocking Cox-1 enzymes tends to reduce the mucus
lining of the stomach, causing GI problems such as stomach upset, ulceration,
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and bleeding. In comparison, the Cox-2 enzyme is located specifically in the
areas that cause inflammation and not in the stomach. By selectively blocking
the Cox-2 enzyme, Cox-2 inhibitors have the potential to reduce GI risks.4
Before FDA approval, clinical trials presented evidence that all three
Cox-2s (Celebrex, Vioxx and Bextra) reduce the incidence of GI ulcers visu
alized at endoscopy compared to certain non-selective NSAIDs. But up to
April 2005, only Vioxx demonstrated a reduced risk for serious GI bleeding in
comparison with naproxen (FDA 2005). After FDA approval, all three Cox-2s
were heavily marketed as being equally effective as traditional NSAIDs but
with less adverse effects on the GI system.
The diffusion of Cox-2 inhibitors was very fast: according to the National
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) and the National Hospital Am-
bulatory Medicare Care Survey (NHAMCS), in 1999 (the first year of Cox-2
introduction), the number of ambulatory visits resulting in Cox-2 prescriptions
were 15 million, slightly more than half of the visits that resulted in the
prescriptions of traditional NSAIDs. By the end of 2000, the number of Cox-2
visits had exceeded those for traditional NSAIDs, reaching an estimate of 31.5
million. This growth continued in 2001, but at a much lower rate (Dai et al.
2005, Table 2).
In terms of prescriptions, according to the New Product Spectra (NPS),5
the total number of new Cox2 prescriptions grew sharply from 61,066 in
January 1999 to 2 million in December 2000, but leveled off after January 2001.
The number of all Cox2 prescriptions (including new and old) demonstrated
a similar pattern. Since Bextra was not approved until November 2001, its
introduction was mainly market stealing (from Celebrex and Vioxx) rather
than market expanding.
As NPS does not track drugs beyond 5 years of the launch, it does not cover
Celebrex after 2003 and does not tell us the prescription trends for traditional
pain-relievers. To develop a rough understanding of these trends, we plotted
the monthly count of prescriptions observed in the individual-level IPSOS
data for each Cox-2 as well as for traditional pain relievers as a whole by
aggregating over individual prescriptions in each month. Although the number
of individuals included in IPSOS is much smaller than those in the NPS, the
diffusion patterns of Cox-2s between 1999 and 2003 obtained were very similar
to those obtained from the NPS above. The aggregate IPSOS data also suggest
that Cox-2s initially stole some market share from traditional pain killers,
but the whole market expanded considerably between 2000 and 2003 before
returning to the 1999 level at the end of 2005. The most obvious decline started
in 2004 and accelerated with the withdrawal of Vioxx and Bextra.
4For a complete layperson description of Cox-2 inhibitors, readers can refer to www.
medicinenet.com.
5NPS is a database provided by IMS Health that tracks monthly number of prescriptions
(new and refills) dispensed by pharmacists and monthly advertising activities of pharmaceutical
manufacturers up to 60 months after initial launch.
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Table 1 Regulatory history of Cox-2s
Brand Date FDA decision
Celebrex Dec. 31, 1998 Approval for rheumatoid and osteoarthritis
Dec. 23, 1999 Approval for reducing the number of intestinal polyps in patients
with familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP)
Jun. 7, 2002 Labeling change because the Celecoxib Long-term Arthritis
Safety Study (CLASS) does not associate Celebrex with
significantly less GI risk as compared to traditional
NSAIDS (ibuprofen or diclofenac)
Dec. 23, 2004 Issuing a Public Health Advisory on an increased cardiovascular
risk in association with Cox-2s and traditional NSAIDS based
on long-term clinical trials
Apr. 7, 2005 New labeling that highlights cardiovascular risk
Vioxx May 20, 1999 Approved for osteoarthritis and pain
Apr. 11, 2002 Approved for rheumatoid arthritis
New warnings concerning reduced GI risk and increased
cadiovascular risk based on the Vioxx Gastrointestinal
Outcomes Research (VIGOR)
Sept. 30, 2004 Withdrawal (voluntary by Merck)
Bextra Nov. 16, 2001 Approved for osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis
Nov. 15, 2002 New warnings on life-threatening skin irritations
Dec. 9, 2004 More warnings on skin irritations and cardiovascular risk
Dec. 23, 2004 Issuing a Public Health Advisory on an increased cardiovascular
risk in association with Cox-2s and traditional NSAIDS
based on long-term clinical trials
Apr. 7, 2005 Withdrawal (by Pfizer)
After a 3-year placebo-controlled clinical trial6 showed that taking Vioxx 25
mg once daily doubles the risk of serious adverse cardiovascular (CV) events,
Merck withdrew Vioxx on September 30, 2004. In April 2005, FDA’s Arthritis
and Drug Safety and Risk Management Advisory Committees reviewed the
available data and concluded that (1) the increased CV risk is a class effect
applying to all the Cox-2s and traditional NSAIDs; (2) Aside from the CV
risk, Bextra is associated with an increased rate of serious and potentially
life-threatening skin reactions and should be withdrawn from the market; (3)
the overall benefits of Celebrex exceeded its potential risks, which allowed
Celebrex to remain on the market but the label had to be revised to carry
explicit warnings on potential CV and GI risks (FDA 2005). The FDA did
not rank the three Cox-2s by their CV risks, but the evidence underlying the
withdrawal requests suggests that the overall quality of Celebrex was better
than the other two, with Vioxx being better than Bextra since only the latter
was associated with skin irritations.
The adverse information about Cox-2 did not come all at once. Before the
final withdrawal of Vioxx and Bextra, the FDA had taken several decisions
regarding the side effects of each Cox-2 brand. As shown in Table 1, FDA
initiated a label change for Celebrex in June 2002 because a long term
clinical trial could not distinguish the amount of GI risk between Celebrex
6The clinical trial was called the Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe).
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and traditional NSAIDs (ibuprofen or diclofenac). This reverses the original
understanding that Celebrex is safer because of lower GI risks. In comparison,
Vioxx received new warnings about increased cardiovascular risk as early as
April 2002. The first FDA warning of skin irritations applied to Bextra on Nov.
2002, and more Bextra warnings came in Dec. 2004 for both skin irritations
and cardiovascular risk. One task of our study is to detect whether these FDA
updates have any impact on the prescription decisions made by doctors before
the Vioxx withdrawal.
3 Data summary
This section describes our data sources, summarizes the raw data, and presents
simple data patterns that suggest across- and within-patient learning.
3.1 Data description
We combine four data sources: (1) patient-level prescription and satisfaction
data from the IPSOS patient diary database (IPSOS-PD), (2) monthly adver-
tising expenditures obtained from the New Product Spectra (NPS) database,
(3) the number of news articles covering Cox-2s derived from Lexis-Nexis for
the period 1999 to 2005, and (4) the number of academic articles covering
Cox-2s from Medline from 1999 to 2005.
In 1997, IPSOS created a national representative sample of 16,000 house-
holds and tracked their drug purchasing month by month.7 The patient diary
covers all the individuals within the sampled household. Each individual, if
observed in the data, is viewed as one patient. Each record in the patient-
level IPSOS data corresponds to one purchase of ethical drugs, including
prescription and over-the-counter medications. The data used in this paper
include all the individual records that IPSOS collected on traditional NSAIDs
as well as on Cox-2s from January 1999 to December 2005.
Each record provides information on the patient’s prescription date, age,
sex, race, household income, education, copay, insurance status, and resi-
dential location defined by nine Census divisions and more than 200 DMAs
(Designated Market Areas). Since over 80% of patients have health insurance
and the self-reported copays are noisy and sometimes inconsistent with the
reported drug insurance, we ignore price/copay information but include insur-
ance status in the empirical analysis.
Specifically, IPSOS collects information on three types of insurance vari-
ables: i) a simple indicator of whether the patient has health insurance or not
at the time of prescription (referred to as HEALTHINS); ii) an indicator of
whether the patient has an insurance plan outside of Medicare or Medicaid
7Detailed description is available at http://www.ipsos.ca/product.cfm?id=66&name=Healthcare
&fn=health&fl=reid and Bowman et al. (2004).
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(referred to as INSPLAN); and iii) an indicator of whether the patient has any
coverage for drug insurance (referred to as DRUGINS). One puzzling aspect
of the data is that the correlations among the three insurance variables are
between 0.12 to 0.24, which is not as high as expected. However, as we see
later, they do seem to have some power explaining prescription behavior. We
include all three variables in the model but only as controls. Our conversations
with drug companies and insurers suggest that a majority of insurers excluded
all Cox-2s from preferred formulary tiers.8 If this applies to every insurer, the
lack of formulary information should not undermine our estimation results,
although it may explain why drug insurance makes a difference in the pre-
scription choice between Cox-2s and non-Cox2s.
Starting from January 2001, the data also provide five satisfaction measures,
reflecting patients’ self reports on the effectiveness of the prescribed drug, its
side effects, whether the drug works quickly, how long it lasts, and whether it is
easy to take. Each satisfaction measure is obtained on a scale from 1 to 5, with
1 denoting extremely satisfied and 5 denoting extremely dissatisfied. Answers
to these questions are likely to reflect the effects that are easily observable to
patients (such as pain relief, stomach upset or skin irritation) but not heart at-
tack or other life-threatening events. In this sense, the patient satisfaction data
do not necessarily capture all the patient experience information conveyed to
the doctor and our learning analysis is subject to this limitation.
The 1999–2005 IPSOS sample involves 28,601 patients and 136,950 observa-
tions of traditional NSAIDs and Cox-2s. Since many traditional NSAIDs (say
Motrin) are available over the counter, we focus on prescriptions only. Out
of the 57,942 filled prescriptions, 20.3% are for Celebrex, 13.6% for Vioxx,
3.9% for Bextra and the rest 62.2% for traditional NSAIDs. To ensure that
this sample is indeed nationally representative, we calculate the number of
COX-2 prescriptions and drug-specific market shares from the sample and
compare their trends with those reported in the NPS. They are similar. We
also regress the number of new COX-2 patients in our sample and the number
of new COX-2 prescriptions in the NPS on various advertising variables,
the regression coefficients and significance are comparable. These results
reassured us about proceeding with the IPSOS data.
The sample is further reduced to 8,077 patients and 27,326 prescriptions
after we (1) focus on the records with non-missing values in all five satisfaction
questions, (2) delete observations that have missing Census division indicators,
and (3) restrict the sample to 2001–2003 when advertising data are available
from NPS. The reduction is largely due to the fact that IPSOS did not collect
8According to http://www.fingertipformulary.com/, which allows us to search for a drug’s current
formulary status by drug name and state in a hundred of medical plans, many traditional NSAIDs
including Naproxen, Indomethacin, Diclofenac and Etodolac are listed in the most favorable
formulary tier (Tier 1) while Celebrex is listed in the least favorable tier (Tier 3). Because the
website only reports formulary as of the search time (January 4, 2008 in our case), we don’t have
data on the historical formulary status of Celebrex. Nor do we have data on Vioxx or Bextra
because they have been withdrawn from market.
















Fig. 1 Number of Rx’s per patient. Source: IPSOS patient diary data on NSAIDS prescriptions.
Total 6,577 patients and 17,329 prescriptions
satisfaction data until 2001. Between 2001 and 2003, the reporting rate for
satisfaction measures is 94.8%.9 To best fit a model of how doctors learn
from patient satisfaction, we focus on new patients that first appear in the
data set on or after January 1, 2001. The main reason for discarding old
patients is because doctors may have formed patient-specific priors based on
their satisfaction before 2001, on which we have no information. However,
the experiences of older patients may have contributed to doctor beliefs about
average drug quality as of January 1, 2001, which will be captured in the model
since we estimate the prior as of January 1, 2001.10 Fortunately, there are
not too many old patients: 6,577 out of the 8,077 patients (with non-missing
satisfaction scores) are new since 2001, and these new patients account for
17,329 prescriptions.
We define a “run” as a sequence of one or more prescriptions of a single
drug. For example, if a patient receives a prescription sequence A,A,A,B,C, we
say that he has three runs, the length of each being 3, 1, 1. By this definition, the
final sample of 17,329 prescriptions are classified into 7,998 runs. An average
run consists of 2.17 prescriptions, and an average patient has 1.22 runs in our
data.11 By definition, new patients are likely to have fewer runs and fewer
prescriptions per run, which explains why the number of prescriptions declined
by 36.6% when we exclude old patients but the number of patients only goes
down by 18.6%.
Conditional on the final sample of 6,577 new patients and 17,329 prescrip-
tions, Fig. 1 shows that 56% of the patients were involved with prescription
NSAIDs only once, and the vast majority (96%) occurred no more than 10
times. Table 2 presents the number of prescription switches between tradi-
9From 2001 to 2003, there are 28,866 NSAIDs prescriptions, of which 27,359 report all five
satisfaction scores.
10What is ignored is how the old patients’ satisfaction reported after 2001 contributes to the across-
patient learning after 2001. We leave this issue for future research.
11The corresponding numbers are 2.37 and 1.23 in Crawford and Shum (2005).
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Table 2 Switching matrix
Frequency Celebrex Vioxx Bextra AllothRx Switching rate
Celebrex 1949 100 41 237 0.16
Vioxx 96 1598 47 229 0.19
Bextra 25 22 389 71 0.23
AllothRx 228 228 97 5395 0.09
Note: Switches are from row to column. Conditional on patients who started after Jan. 1, 2001 and
had at least two NSAIDS prescriptions before the end of 2003
tional NSAIDs and the three Cox-2s. By definition, a switch does not occur
unless a patient has at least two prescriptions. On average, the switching rate of
traditional NSAIDs (9%) is lower than that of Celebrex (16%), Vioxx (19%)
and Bextra (23%). This is partly because we aggregate different brands of
traditional NSAIDs into one category.
Table 3 summarizes satisfaction scores by drug and the five satisfaction
questions. On average (across all five questions which we denote as satisf12345),
patients are more satisfied with all three Cox-2s than they are with traditional
NSAIDs, although the specific satisfaction for effectiveness is the lowest for
Bextra. Within Cox-2s, Celebrex is the best in all five questions, with Vioxx
being the worst in side effects and Bextra the worst in the other four. These
patterns are hardly significant at conventional levels, but they are consistent
with the fact that FDA kept Celebrex on the market but requested the
withdrawal of Vioxx based on cardiovascular risk and the withdrawal of Bextra
based on both cardiovascular risk and severe skin irritation. Another possible
interpretation of why Bextra has the worst satisfaction score is that those
who got Bextra are those who are more resistant to other Cox-2s and doctors
prescribed Bextra to them as the last resort.
The five satisfaction measures are highly correlated (the correlations range
from 0.87 to 0.97), so we will use their average satisf12345 in the final models.
Averaging across the five satisfaction measures also allows us to smooth the
discreteness in a single measure and therefore to get closer to the distributional
assumption we need to make in the Bayesian model. We will revisit this issue
when we present the structural results.
Table 3 Mean and standard deviation of satisfaction scores (total: 6,577 patients 17,329
observations)
allothRx Celebrex Vioxx Bextra
Effectiveness 1.90 (1.11) 1.81 (1.03) 1.83 (1.03) 1.94 (1.13)
Side effects 1.98 (1.14) 1.81 (1.06) 1.89 (1.12) 1.82 (1.06)
Works quickly 2.03 (1.10) 1.94 (1.04) 1.99 (1.06) 2.00 (1.09)
How long does it last? 2.04 (1.11) 1.93 (1.04) 1.96 (1.06) 1.98 (1.06)
Easy to take 1.51 (1.01) 1.38 (0.87) 1.38 (0.89) 1.40 (0.92)
Average effectiveness (satisf134) 1.99 (1.04) 1.89 (0.97) 1.93 (0.98) 1.97 (1.04)
Average across five (satisf12345) 1.90 (0.94) 1.77 (0.87) 1.81 (0.88) 1.83 (0.91)
(1=extremely satisfied, 5=extremely dissatisfied)
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One may argue that self-reported patient satisfaction does not necessarily
reflect the true experience because patients may adjust their report according
to other information available about the drug even if their real experience
does not vary over time. To address this possibility, we compare the average
satisfaction of all Cox-2 prescriptions before and after June 2002. Since FDA
changed the label of Celebrex in June 2002 and issued a Vioxx warning in
April 2002, June 2002 roughly captures the first official occurrence of adverse
information for Cox-2 inhibitors. We find that the average satisfaction before
and after June 2002 is quite similar (1.8530 vs. 1.8553) and the conclusion
remains the same if we restrict the calculation to the 809 patients that appeared
both before and after June 2002 (1.8018 vs. 1.8072).
All three Cox-2s were heavily marketed. The average monthly advertising
expenditures (pooling detailing, journal advertising, and direct-to-consumer
advertising) were 20.3M, 21.4M, and 10.5M dollars during the time period
of 2001 to 2003 for Celebrex, Vioxx and Bextra, respectively. Although not
reported here, the flow of advertising expenditure was comparable across
drugs and even over time. Also, the trend of total advertising is quite similar to
the trend of total prescriptions described previously. Since traditional NSAIDs
involve a large number of brands and most of them had been on the market
for a long time, we do not obtain advertising data for traditional NSAIDs. This
is equivalent to assuming traditional NSAIDs have zero advertising since the
start of our sample period.
To address the possibility that news and scientific evidence may affect
drug sales (Azoulay 2002; Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007), we count
the number of news and journal articles related to Cox-2s from 1999 to
2005. Specifically, news articles are obtained from the Lexis-Nexis search
of keywords Cox 2, Cox-2, Cox2, celebrex, vioxx, bextra, Cyclooxygenase-2,
Cyclooxygenase2, and Cyclooxygenase 2 across all the U.S. newspapers and
magazines. For each relevant article, we record title, publication date, publi-
cation region, and the news source. To focus on Cox-2 inhibitors, we delete
articles that talk about Cox-1 and Cox2 enzyme but not inhibitors. Lexis-
Nexis classifies articles into four regions: Midwest, Northeast, Southeast and
Western. They are matched with the nine Census divisions (used in the IPSOS
data) by the standard Census definition.12 To account for the fact that some
newspapers and magazines are read more often than others, we obtain the
total circulation from the Audit Bureau of Circulations. Whenever applicable,
we distinguish circulation on weekdays, Saturday and Sunday, and use the
one that matches best with the publication date of the article. Articles that
do not specify source or do not have circulation data for the specified source
are excluded.
12Except for Southeast, the names of Lexis-Nexis regions match perfectly with those of Census
regions. We interpret “Southeast” in Lexis-Nexis as “South” in Census. The crosswalk between
the four Census regions and the nine Census divisions is available at www.census.gov.
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From article titles, we define dummy variables indicating whether the article
sounds negative, positive or neutral. For example, “Cox-2s increase the risk
of ..” is counted negative but “Celebrex is easier on stomach” is counted
positive. If the title includes both positive and negative words (or neither),
it is counted neutral. The article title also tells us whether the article focuses
on a particular Cox-2 brand or not. If yes, the article is only matched with
the specific brand. If no, the article is presumably applicable to all the Cox-2s
available on the market. In total, the Lexis-Nexis search results in 973 articles
with valid circulation information, which includes 92 positive, 122 neutral and
756 negative articles.
Academic articles about Cox-2 are gathered from Medline search of the
same keywords, covering all the domestic and international journals in Med-
line. For each search result, we record title, abstract, publication date, and
the name of the publishing journal. To focus on human subjects, we rule
out articles that examine Cox-2 effects on animals only. Since most Medline
journals are monthly or bi-monthly, we take the first day of the first issue
month as the publication date. For example, both “April” and “April–June”
issues are coded as published on April 1. Medline offers no regional distinction
and more than 80% of articles do not focus on a specific brand name, so we
assume all the non-specific articles applies to all the Cox-2s available on the
market. The brand-specific articles are applied to the mentioned brand only.
Medline journals also differ greatly in terms of impact. To address this,
we weigh each journal with the 2002 Science Gateway Impact Factor.13 In
total, we collect 1064 medical articles between 1999 and 2005, 950 of which
have a valid impact factor. Missing impact factor is imputed by the mode of
all the non-missing impacts. Like in Lexis-Nexis, we use title and abstract
to classify Medline articles into negatives (13.44%), positive (28.19%) and
neutral (58.36%). Note that the percent of negative titles is much lower for
Medline articles than for news reports (78%). This suggests that the main
effect of Medline articles is likely to come from the non-negatives. To simplify
estimation, we pool positive and neutral as non-negatives but distinguish
negatives and non-negatives for both types of articles.
As a robustness check, we also record whether article authors are affiliated
with a pharmaceutical company, a university, or other institutions, and whether
the article talks about efficacy, side effects, or both. These variables are highly
correlated with each other: for example articles affiliated with pharmaceutical
companies are more likely to be non-negative and focus on efficacy. The high
correlation prevents us from identifying the impact of each variable separately.
Instead, we focus on negatives and non-negatives in the main specification, but
discuss the effects of the other variables via a robustness check.
Figure 2 plots the weighted monthly counts where the weight is circulation
for news articles and journal impact factor for Medline articles. Figures 3
and 4 decompose article counts into negative and non-negatives. One pattern
13http://www.sciencegateway.org/impact/if02a.html




































Fig. 4 Lexis-Nexis articles weighted by circulation (1=one Wall Street Journal article). Source of
Figs. 2–4: Lexis-Nexis 1999–2005 for news articles. Medline 1999–2005 for journal articles. News
articles are weighted by newspaper circulations reported by the Audit Bureau of Circulations
(www.accessabs.com). Journal articles are weighted by the 2002 impact factor from Science
Gateway (http://www.sciencegateway.org/impact/if02a.html). Positive, neutral and negative are
defined by authors’ reading of article title and abstract
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that stands out most is the dramatic difference before and after 2004. Before
the Vioxx withdrawal, the 1999–2003 period was characterized by occasional
news and journal articles, in stable flow, and at most times non-negative
in nature. In 2004 and 2005, huge spikes of negative news appear around
the Vioxx withdrawal, the first lawsuit against Vioxx, and the withdrawal of
Bextra. Medline articles also show a negative spike at the beginning of 2005,
which we interpret as a lag effect of the Vioxx withdrawal in Sept. 2004.
Based on these figures, we suspect the learning process may have changed
substantially after the Vioxx withdrawal. In this paper, we focus on the pre-
withdrawal period (2001–2003), while leaving the post period (2004–2005) for
future research.
Finally, on the basis of Table 1, we create three dummy variables to indicate
the FDA updates that occurred in our analysis period (2001–2003). Namely,
new warnings added on Apr. 11, 2002 for Vioxx, new warnings added on
Nov. 15, 2002 for Bextra, and label change as of Jun. 7, 2002 for Celebrex.
So far we have documented five sources of information: patient satisfaction,
manufacturer advertising, news articles, Medline articles, and FDA updates.
The time-series correlation across the five categories is no more than 0.3.14
Such low correlation suggests that different sources may contain different
types of information and it is possible to identify their impacts separately in
a single model.
3.2 Basic evidence of learning
Since patient satisfaction is unique to our data, it is important to demonstrate
its link with prescription decisions. In particular, if doctors learn anything from
patient satisfaction, market shares should become more stable over time and
satisfaction scores should correlate with drug market shares and drug switches
within patient. To confirm this intuition, Fig. 5 presents the market share
evolution in our sample period (January 2001 to December 2003) for Celebrex,
Vioxx, Bextra, and all other NSAIDs prescriptions separately. The market
share of traditional NSAIDs has dropped from over 70% to roughly 60%
in March 2002 and remains stable afterwards. Similarly, Celebrex and Vioxx
fluctuates a little bit less over time while Bextra market share picks up from 0%
upon introduction to slightly below 10% at the end of 2003. These evolutionary
patterns are consistent with learning. Figure 6 plots the evolution of average
patient satisfaction, which shows no obvious up- or downward trends during
2001–2003. Consistent with the lack of change in the average satisfaction score
before and after June 2002 (as reported in Section 3.1), this suggests that there
is little evidence of patients adjusting their satisfaction report based on the
sales or FDA updates of Cox-2 inhibitors. It is also comforting to note that, by
14One complication in calculating the correlations is that all these measures are in different time
units. We choose to aggregate up to a monthly level, and then calculate correlations among the
monthly level quantities.
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Fig. 5 Cox-2 shares (6,577 patients, 17,329 Rx’s)
the end of 2003, the order of average satisfaction score (as shown in Table 3)
is consistent with the order of market shares within the three Cox-2 inhibitors
(Celebrex>Vioxx>Bextra).
We then run a logit regression on whether the drug prescribed to patient
p in time t is different from p’s last prescription (changes within the non-
Cox2 NSAIDs are counted as non-switch). The key independent variable
is the satisfaction scores patient p reported for the drug taken on the last
prescription. Since this regression focuses on drug switch, we exclude first
prescription (per patient) from our cleaned data, which leaves 2,887 patients
and 13,637 prescriptions in the logit sample.
As shown in Table 4 Column (1), the more satisfied a patient is with the
current prescription (i.e. the lower score of satisf12345), the less likely she
switches to other brands. Decomposing satisfaction into different dimensions,
Column (2) shows that the key effect of satisfaction is driven by drug efficacy
(satisf134) instead of “side effects” (satisf2) or “easy to take” (satisf5).
Table 4 Column (3) adds other sources of information into the switch
regression. Since advertising may potentially have an s-shape impact on drug
diffusion, we use the inverse of the cumulative total advertising expenditure
Fig. 6 Satisfaction (1=extremely satisfied)
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Table 4 Logit model on brand switching
(1) Coefficients (2) Coefficients (3) Coefficients
[t-stat] [t-stat] [t-stat]
Overall satisfication (satisf12345) 0.1269*** 0.1406***
[4.1958] [4.5999]
Drug effectiveness (satisf134) 0.1318***
[3.0934]
Side effects (satisf2) 0.0399
[1.0477]
Ease to take (satisf5) −0.0666*
[−1.7272]
Inverse of advertising 0.8509*
[1.8357]
Medline article (neg) −0.6724**
[−2.4953]
Medline article (non-neg) 1.0848**
[2.5531]
Lexis article (neg) 0.037
[0.7903]
Lexis article (non-neg) −0.0852*
[−1.7889]
After FDA updates 0.0088
[0.0572]
Intercept −2.1172*** −2.1241*** −5.3796***
[−33.1160] [−32.4455] [−3.4811]
Log likelihood −4189.9 −4186.9 −4092.7
# of patients 2887 2887 2887
# of prescriptions 13639 13639 13639
Dependent variable: switch=1 if switch brand from the last period (taking all traditional NSAIDS
as one brand)
Independent variables: satisfaction scores (1=extremely satisfied, 5=extremely dissatisfied) re-
ported in the last period, advertising (measured as the inverse of cumulative sum of total
advertising expenditures up to the previous month), article counts (measured as the log of
cumulative sum of weighted articles up to the previous day), and FDA update dummy
Source: IPSOS patient diary data 2001–2003
T-statistics in brackets. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
since FDA approval (i.e. detailing + journal advertising + DTC advertising).
This mimics the reciprocal model of advertising in the marketing literature
(Lilien et al. 1992). Results are qualitatively similar if we use the total ad-
vertising in linear form. Aside from advertising, we also include Medline and
Lexis-Nexis article counts up to t, and whether t is after the FDA update for
the drug of p’s last prescription. The coefficient of satisf12345 is comparable
to that in Column (1). As we expect, advertising and non-negative news
articles deter switch but the other coefficients are either insignificant (the
FDA update dummy and negative news articles) or counterintuitive (the
negative and non-negative Medline articles). Note that this regression focuses
on the information related to the last prescription taken by the same patient
but ignores information of other available brands. This shortcoming will be
corrected in our full model.
Another unique feature of our study is the distinction between across- and
within-patient learning. Does the raw data contain evidence for both types of
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learning? The simplest way to demonstrate across-patient learning is tracking
nationwide market shares by drug-month. If across-patient learning exists, the
market shares should stabilize over time. To quantify the stabilization, we
compute the standard deviation of the monthly market share within 2001,
2002, and 2003 separately for each drug. Although not shown, we find that
the standard deviation of monthly share declines year by year for all drugs,
suggesting that the market shares become more stable over time.
Because we do not observe the identity of the doctor, we have to assume
that the across-patient information is shared within a specific geographic
area. In the IPSOS data, the most detailed geographic area that yields a
sufficient number of prescriptions for information sharing is census division.
If information sharing is restricted to within each of the nine census divisions,
we should observe significant heterogeneity of market shares across regions.
In contrast, if information sharing is nationwide, market shares should be
homogenous across regions. To test for these two extremes, we regress the
number of prescription at a month-drug-division level on a full set of drug
dummies and a full set of division dummies. The joint test of all division
dummies having the same coefficient is rejected with a p-value less than 1e-4.
A more detailed look at the division coefficients suggest that each division is
different from another, which motivates us to model across-patient learning by
census division.
A careful reader may still wonder whether the observed heterogeneity
of market share reflects demographic heterogeneity across division rather
than distinctive learning within each division. Unfortunately, the regression
reported above is conducted at the month-drug-division level, which makes it
difficult to control for patient heterogeneity. However, as shown below, our
full model examines the degree of learning after controlling for individual
demographics including gender, age, education, income, and three measures of
insurance status. Under that structure, we find that the model estimated with
division-wide learning has a significantly better fit to the data than the model
of nationwide learning. We should have found the opposite if the market
share heterogeneity across divisions were solely attributed to the difference
in observable demographics.
To better detect within-patient learning, we examine the number of switches
in different phases of treatment. Taking each patient as the unit of analysis,
we find that the number of switches in the first half of a patient’s treatment
regimen is always greater than the number of switches in the second half. This
suggests that significant learning has taken place within each patient.
4 Econometric model and identification
4.1 Model
Consider a situation in which doctor d has concluded that patient p needs a
pain relieving prescription of a fixed length starting from time t, but has not
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determined which drug is the best choice. More specifically, the choice set
includes traditional NSAIDs and whatever Cox-2s that are available at t. In
making such choice, the doctor maximizes the patient’s expected utility for
this single prescription.
Here we make three assumptions: in reality the doctor-patient relationship
involves a number of information and incentive issues, and the doctor may not
act as a perfect agent for the patient. We ignore such imperfections because
we have no data on individual doctors. Second, we consider all the traditional
NSAIDs as one drug and do not distinguish brands within this group. The main
reason is that traditional NSAIDs involve dozens of brands and we do not
have advertising and article reports for each specific brand. Treating traditional
NSAIDs as one outside good helps us focus on the tradeoff between traditional
NSAIDs and the three brands of Cox-2 Inhibitors. Third, we assume that each
doctor is myopic and focuses on the current prescription. As detailed below,
we assume that a doctor considers all the drug information available to her
up to t, but she does not consider how experience learned from the current
prescription would affect her future prescription choice on the same or other
patients. For more discussion on forward-looking behavior, see the robustness
checks section (and Crawford and Shum 2005).








˜Qpjt = doctor’s belief about drug j’s quality for patient p at time t;
γ = risk aversion parameter, non-negative. A zero γ implies risk
neutrality;
Xpt = patient p’s characteristics at time t;
Zjt = drug j’s characteristics at time t;
pjt = extreme value error.
The information process is modeled as follows. Doctors are uncertain about
˜Qpjt, which can be decomposed into two parts: the general quality of drug j
that applies to every patient (referred to as Q j); and the specific match value
between drug j and patient p (referred to as qpj). The true effect of drug j on
patient p is therefore
Qpj = Q j + qpj.
This term is fixed but unknown to the doctor or the researcher. Over the entire
population, we assume qpj is independent and identically distributed according
to a normal distribution N(0, σ 2q0).
15As γ goes to zero, the utility function becomes linear.
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When drug j is first introduced to the market (or at the beginning of our
data set), all doctors share two priors: for the general quality of drug j, the
prior is
˜Q j 0 ∼ N
(
Q¯ j 0, σ 2Q j 0
)
.
The prior for the patient-drug match (qpj) is mean independent of Q j 0 and can
be written as:





Together, the prior for the specific quality of drug j on patient p is
˜Qpj 0 = ˜Q j 0 + q˜pj 0 ∼ N
(
Q¯ j 0, σ 2Q j 0 + σ 2q0
)
.
We allow both Q¯ j 0 and σQ j 0 to be drug-specific. This reflects the fact that
the initial information about the average drug quality, whether it is from FDA
guidelines, medical research, or patient experience, may differ across drugs.
For example, the prior on Celebrex and Vioxx is defined as of January 1, 2001
and the prior on Bextra is defined as of March 1, 2002 (the first date that Bextra
appears in our data set). Since doctors may have learned about Celebrex and
Vioxx before 2001, the prior should be less dispersed for them than for Bextra.
Since we put no restrictions on σQ j 0 , we can test this conjecture in the data. For
simplicity, we assume the amount of patient heterogeneity (captured by σq0 )
is the same across all three drugs. We assume that doctors prior belief on the
distribution of patient heterogeneity coincides with the actual distribution.
We assume doctors located in the same geographic area (say a Census
region, a Census division, or a DMA) share information immediately and
extensively. Assuming each prescription generates one signal, patient p’s
satisfaction with drug j at time t, denoted as Rpjt, is a noisy but unbiased
indicator of the true quality:16
Rpjt = α0 + αR · (Q j + qpj) + υpjt
where α0 and αR equalize the scales of R and Q, and the signal noise υ
conforms to N(0, σ 2υ ).
Let nRpjt denote the number of satisfaction reports from patient p on drug j
up to time t, and R¯pjt denote the average satisfaction across these nRpjt reports.
At time t, doctors in the same area will use all the nRpjt signals across all local
patients to update their beliefs on the average drug quality Q j. However,
because patients are independent from each other, the experience of patients
other than p does not contain any information about qpj.
With all the patient satisfaction information up to t, doctor’s posterior on the
effect of drug j on patient p can be decomposed into two parts: (1) doctor’s
16Chan et al. (2007) do not observe the realization of signals. They use patients’ stated switching
reasons to create boundary conditions for those signals.
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posterior about the general quality of drug j, and (2) doctor’s posterior about
the specific match between drug j and patient p. That is:
˜Qpjt = ˜Q jt + q˜pjt.

















































σ 2υ + nRpjt · α2R · σ 2q0
+ Q¯ j 0




σ 2υ + nRpjt · α2R · σ 2q0
+ 1
σ 2Q j 0
q¯pjt =
σ 2q0 · nRpjt · αR ·
(
R¯pjt − α0 − αR · Q¯ jt
)










s a1 · · · · · · aP jt
a1 m1
...
. . . 0
... 0
. . .
























Note that the two posterior beliefs, ˜Q jt and q˜pjt, are correlated because both
make use of the satisfaction information from patient p. Also note that as more
patients become involved with the drug over time (i.e., P jt increases over time),
the length of the quality vector increases over time. That is, the size of −1jt
increases over time. We give the formula for −1jt instead of  jt because the
former is the natural product in deriving the posterior density. But we can show
that the across-patient terms in −1jt are all zero, and we exploit this special
structure to analytically invert it to get  jt. Inverting −1jt results in a matrix
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without zero elements (see Appendix). This implies that the posterior of q˜pjt
is no longer independent across patients. This is because all the updates of qpj
rely on the update of Q j, which in turn relies on satisfaction reports from all
patients.
























Q¯pjt− 12 γ σ 2˜Qpjt +βxj Xpt+βz Z jt+pjt
)]
/γ
Thus, maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the
following,
U pjt = U¯ pjt + pjt = Q¯pjt − 12γ σ
2
˜Qpjt
+ βxjXpt + βz Z jt + pjt
where σ 2
˜Qpjt
denotes the posterior variance of ˜Qpjt. In the Appendix we show
that we can obtain σ 2
˜Qpjt
directly from the elements in matrix −1jt . The standard













From the prescribing probabilities, we can estimate parameters by maximiz-









The intuition behind the learning model can be summarized as following:
before seeing patient p, doctor has a specific prior about the average quality
of drug j (Q j) and the specific match between p and j (qpj). The true values
of Q j and qpj are constant over time but the doctor is uncertain about them.
When p reports a signal of satisfaction (Rpjt), doctor recognizes it as a mixture
of the true Q j, the true qpj, plus random noise. Note that every patient’s
signal reflects Q j but only patient p’s signal reflects qpj. This implies that
doctor can use the average of every newly-reported signal to gather new
information about Q j. The formula for the posterior mean of Q j reflects this
simple updating process.
In comparison, the update on qpj is much trickier: although in theory the
satisfaction of other patients on drug j (labeled as Rp′ jt) does not reflect the
idiosyncratic match value of qpj, doctor will use part of Rp′ jt to update her
belief on Q j and then employ the updated belief to better understand which
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part of patient p’s signal reflects Q j and which part reflects qpj. Because of
this link, Rp′ jt will enter the posterior mean of qpj indirectly and therefore the
posterior means of Q j and qpj are interdependent. Similarly, although the true
values of drug-patient match are independent across patients (by assumption),
the posterior means of qpj and qp′ j are not statistically independent. This com-
plication highlights the fundamental connection between across- and within-
patient learning and demonstrates why they must be modeled jointly.
4.2 Estimation issues
The model presented above focuses on one type of signal, patient satisfaction.
In reality, there are many types of signals. FDA updates, media reports,
academic articles and manufacturer advertising could all be viewed as noisy
signals of the average drug efficacy that affects doctor’s Bayesian update.
However, estimating the Bayesian role of these signals requires each one of
them have enough variation over time and across patients. In a Bayesian
world, lack of variation adds to the difficulty in estimating the precision of
a signal. When we allow both advertising and patient satisfaction to enter
the Bayesian updating process, the model estimation has trouble converging.
When it does converge, the variance term corresponding to advertising is
extremely large, suggesting that the monthly advertising data may not provide
enough variation to identify the variance. Given that FDA updates and article
data have even less variation than advertising, it is difficult to model all of them
in the framework of Bayesian learning.
To address this computation problem, we model patient satisfaction as a
signal that contributes to the Bayesian learning but treat all the other factors
as drug attributes (Zjt) that directly enter the utility function. This implies that
all the true effects of advertising, if they exist, are captured in the coefficient
of advertising. Because drug manufacturers may adjust advertising intensity by
historical or predicted sales and we do not address the potential endogeneity
problem, we treat advertising as pure control.
Specifically, the model described above circumvents the estimation difficulty
but still allows all types of factors to play a role in prescription choice. The
disadvantage is that we can no longer rely on the Bayesian structure to describe
how historical information in FDA updates, advertising, news report and
Medline articles affect a patient’s expected utility. Rather, we define Zjt as
a vector, where each non-advertising element corresponds to the log of the
cumulative sum of one factor. To better capture a potential s-shape impact
of advertising, we use the inverse of cumulative total advertising (detailing +
journal advertising + DTC) instead of advertising itself (Lilien et al. 1992).
Since the model treats patient satisfaction and other sources of information
differently, the magnitudes of their structural coefficients are not directly
comparable. As shown below, we evaluate their relative importance by (1)
comparing models with and without certain information, and (2) using our
preferred model to predict drug diffusion in (hypothetical) scenarios that vary
by information structure.
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Another estimation issue is whether we should treat traditional NSAIDs,
Celebrex, Vioxx and Bextra as four branches in a simple logit, or assume a
nested logit structure where a doctor first chooses between traditional NSAIDs
and Cox-2, and then decides which brand is the best within the nest of Cox-2.
We have estimated both, results are almost identical (in both likelihood value
and coefficient magnitude). The parameter that describes the substitutability
of the two nests is estimated at 0.99, which implies that the nested logit is
analytically the same as the simple logit. In light of this finding, we only report
the results based on the simple logit model.
4.3 Identification
Overall, the econometric model includes four sets of parameters: [βxj, βz] cap-
ture the effects of individual demographics and drug attributes, [Q¯ j 0, σQ j 0, σq0 ]
capture doctor’s prior, [α0, αR, συ] capture the importance of patient satisfac-
tion, and γ captures doctor’s risk preference. As discussed above, FDA up-
dates, inverse of manufacturer advertising, news reports, and Medline articles
are treated as drug attributes, and their impact on patient utility are captured
in βz.
The identification of βxj comes from the time-invariant prescription pattern
across patients. For example, if Cox-2 prescriptions tend to be concentrated in
the elderly, it translates into a significant and positive coefficient corresponding
to the interaction of Cox-2 and age. Similarly, βz is identified from the co-
movements of drug market shares and various drug information. In principle,
causality could go either way for advertising: on the one hand, advertising
may trigger sales; on the other hand, historical or predicted sales patterns may
motivate changes in advertising intensity. This implies that the coefficient for
advertising is better interpreted as the correlation between advertising and
sales rather than a causal effect.
The prior means of drug quality, Q¯ j 0, are identified from initial market
shares. Because we include traditional NSAIDs as the outside good whose
efficacy is well-known to doctors, we normalize its Q as zero. The prior of the
three Cox-2s are all identified relative to the traditional NSAIDs. However,
patient satisfaction R is reported in absolute terms. Apparently, the noise in
R, denoted by συ , is determined by the heterogeneity in R. Since we assume
R equals a linear function of true quality Qpj plus noise, we can derive
συ by regressing Rpjt on a full set of patient-drug dummies and calculating
the standard deviation of the residuals. This procedure does not require any
prescription data, so we estimate συ and fix it when estimating the full model.
Parameters, α0 and αR, describe the scale difference between satisfaction
R and true quality Qpj. However, since we do not know Qpj, they must be
proxied by the posteriors, which are in turn reflected in evolving market shares.
If the diffusion path is flat for each drug, the lack of updating implies that
patient satisfaction has little impact, which amounts to αR = 0. If drug j’s
diffusion path is positively related to drug j’s average satisfaction over time,
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it implies a significant, positive αR. The other term, α0, is simply an intercept
that is derived from the relative scale of R and Q.
The dispersion on the prior of the average quality of drug j, namely σQ j 0 ,
is identified by the speed of diffusion. According to the Bayesian formula, the
mean of the posterior, Q¯ jt, is essentially a weighted average between R and the
prior mean Q¯ j 0, while the weights are inversely related to the amount of noise
in the two terms. Since we already identify the noise of R, a relatively small
(large) σQ j 0 implies that doctors believe the prior is relatively precise (noisy)
and therefore put less (more) weight on patient satisfaction, which results in
slow (fast) learning.
Similarly, the dispersion on the prior of patient-drug match, namely σq0 ,
is identified by how fast doctors update their patient-specific beliefs. Small
(large) σq0 implies that patient p’s doctor is reluctant (eager) to revise her
prior after she receives p ’s satisfaction report, because she thinks the report is
relatively noisy (precise).
The risk aversion parameter, γ , is identified by a functional form restriction.
As noted in Coscelli and Shum (2004), the data only tell us about the term
Q¯pjt − 12γ σ 2˜Qpjt . The fact that we assumed a CARA utility function leads to a
linear decomposition into the mean and variance terms.
5 Results
As described in Section 3, we focus on the patients that first appear in the data
on or after January 1, 2001. The analysis sample ends at December 31, 2003
and is conditional on the prescriptions that come with valid answers for all
five satisfaction questions. The final sample involves 6,577 patients and 17,329
prescriptions.
5.1 Benchmark model without learning
Before estimating the structural model, we check two benchmark models.
These benchmarks utilize a discrete choice framework but do not incorporate
a learning structure. Comparing them with our structural model will help us
understand the importance of the learning structure. Specifically, Benchmark
I estimates the prescription choice within traditional NSAIDs and the three
brands of Cox-2s, assuming that the utility of patient p using drug j is:
U pjt = β j 0 + βssatisf jt + βxjXpt + βz Zjt + pjt.
Here satisf jt denotes the average satisfaction reported for drug j up to time t.
To capture the fundamental difference across drugs, we also include a set of
drug dummies, whose impacts on utility are captured by coefficients β j 0.
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Benchmark II omits patient satisfaction in the utility function so that a
comparison of the two benchmark models would highlight the role of patient
satisfaction. Specifically, the utility function for Benchmark II is:
U pjt = βj 0 + βxjXpt + βz Zjt + pjt.
Assuming logit errors, we can write out the probability of patient p choosing
drug j and maximize the overall likelihood. We normalize the satisfaction
measure as 6 − satisf12345 so that a positive coefficient on patient satisfaction
implies that the more satisfied patients are, the better the drug choice is. Since
the benchmark models do not incorporate the learning structure, in order to
capture all the information available up to the study period, we compute the
satisfaction variable as the average of all satisfaction reports up to one month
before the prescription month.
To be consistent with the structural model, we use the inverse of total
advertising cumulated from the day of drug entry up to one month before the
prescription month. We have tried other definitions, including the cumulative
sum itself (with or without log), the advertising flow (instead of cumulative
sum), and the monthly average of the cumulative sum. Results are qualitatively
similar.
To estimate the extent to which doctors prescribe based on observable
patient demographics, we allow the coefficient of patient demographics (βxj)
to vary by whether drug j is a traditional NSAIDs or a Cox-2. In other words,
these coefficients capture doctors’ preferences between traditional NSAIDs
and Cox-2s, but not within Cox-2s. Allowing βxj to vary by Cox-2 brand does
not change the results.17
As shown in Table 5, when we include patient satisfaction and other sources
of information in Benchmark I, patient satisfaction has a positive and signifi-
cant impact for all three Cox-2s. The satisfaction coefficient is larger for Bextra,
probably because Bextra is newer than the other two drugs. In terms of other
information, the coefficient of inverse advertising is negative as expected but
indistinguishable from zero at the 95% confidence level. The coefficients for
Lexis-Nexis articles are significantly positive (and more prominent in the non-
negative ones), but both coefficients for negative and non-negative Medline
articles are insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient of FDA updates is positive
(and marginally significant), which is surprising given the fact that most FDA
updates have negative content. The three intercepts suggest that Celebrex and
Vioxx are viewed better than Bextra, everything else being equal. This reflects
the fact that Bextra has the smallest market share among the three Cox-2s.
In demographics, older, high-income males with private health insurance are
more likely to receive Cox-2 prescriptions.
Omitting patient satisfaction leads to a worse fit in Benchmark II. In
comparison with Benchmark I, advertising appears to be much more important
17Another way to address patient demographics is including them as concomitant variables, as
suggested in Dayton and Macready (1988).





Notes: Throughout Tables 5
to 9, the default drug is
traditional NSAIDS.
T-statistics in brackets.
Satisfaction is measured by
6-satisf12345, computed as
the average of all patient
satisfaction up to the month
before prescription.
Advertising variable is
measured as the inverse of
cumulative sum of advertising
expenditures up to the
previous month. Articles are
measured as the log of
cumulative sum of weighted
articles up to the previous day
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
(1) Coefficients (2) Coefficients
[t-stat] [t-stat]
Intercept of Celebrex −4.6079*** −2.1321***
[−5.3824] [−2.8039]
Intercept of Vioxx −3.5984*** −2.2336***
[−4.1337] [−2.8906]








Inverse of −0.2749 −2.0548***
advertising [−1.0472] [−5.6204]
Cox2 * age 0.0333*** 0.0337***
[30.273] [30.6364]
Cox2 * sex −0.0967*** −0.1086***
[−2.8441] [−3.157]
Cox2 * low income −0.1319*** −0.1225***
[−3.961] [−3.5714]
Cox2 * low education −0.0089 −0.0136
[−0.2618] [−0.3988]
Cox2 * HEALTHINS 0.0606 0.0698
[0.8301] [0.9790]
Cox2 * INSPLAN 0.6539*** 0.6653***
[11.911] [11.9443]
Cox2 * DRUGINS −0.1759*** −0.1729***
[−5.0986] [−4.9119]
Medline article (neg) −0.2032 −0.1867
[−1.623] [−1.6179]
Medline article (non-neg) 0.1910 0.1457
[0.8534] [0.6912]
Lexis article (neg) 0.0626*** 0.0606***
[3.3122] [3.1563]
Lexis article (non-neg) 0.0903*** 0.0889***
[4.8548] [4.7287]
After FDA update 0.0969* 0.1091*
[1.7211] [1.8746]
Log likelihood −17226 −17315
# of patients 6577 6577
# of prescriptions 17329 17329
in this case. Further, the coefficient of the Bextra dummy is no longer worse
than those of Celebrex and Vioxx. As we see below, these results suggest that a
discrete choice model without patient satisfaction is subject to omitted variable
bias.
5.2 Model with learning
The results on the two benchmark models encourage us to think more
systematically about patient satisfaction. Accordingly, the structural model
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adds a Bayesian learning structure on top of the classical discrete choice
framework.
Recall that each individual satisfaction measure is discrete but the five
satisfaction measures are very closely correlated (with correlation coefficient
ranging between 0.87 and 0.97). These high correlations motivate us to use
satisf12345 as a continuous measure of Rpjt. As discussed in Section 4.3, we
estimate the structural model in two steps: first, we regress Rpjt on a full set
of patient-drug (pj) dummies, and compute the residuals’ standard deviation.
According to our model, this standard deviation gives us an unbiased estimate
of συ . With R-square 0.697, the regression produces συ = 0.496. Ideally, we
need the residual to be normally distributed so that the model can yield
close solutions to the posterior belief. Although not shown here, a plot of
the histogram of these residuals shows that the distribution is symmetric
and close to the bell shape. Having said that, we acknowledge the potential
approximation error that could be caused by treating the discrete satisfaction
scores as continuous signals. In the second step, we set συ at 0.496 and search
for the best parameters that maximize the overall log likelihood.
A potential concern is that treating υ as a normally distributed variable may
make the signal R go beyond the range of 1 to 5. Though the probability of
this is positive, we argue it is reasonably small and will not generate severe
estimation bias. Specifically, the average satisf12345 throughout our whole
sample is 1.794 and the estimated standard deviation of υ is 0.496. Given the
normal assumption, this implies that the probability of a signal below 1 is less
than 5.5% and the probability of it being above 5 is less than 0.01%.18
Results reported below assume that doctors talk to each other within a
census division. As discussed in Section 3, we observe significant heterogeneity
of market shares across divisions, which suggests that information is not
fully shared across divisions. As a confirmation, we also run the structural
model assuming nationwide information pooling and find that it generates a
significantly worse fit to the data.
Table 6 presents three sets of structural results: Column (1) presents a
BASIC model that incorporates all sources of information. To gauge the
relative importance of within-patient and across-patient learning, Column (2)
ignores within-patient learning (by setting σq0 = 0) and Column (3) ignores
across-patient learning (by setting σQ j 0 = 0).
All three models set the risk parameter as zero (which implies risk-
neutrality). When we estimate the full model with risk preference, the risk
parameter is extremely close to zero (γˆ = 1.2e − 23 with t-stat less than 0.01).
18These probability estimates are obtained using the cumulative density function of a normal
distribution with mean 1.794 and standard deviation 0.496.
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Table 6 Models with different learning structure
(1) Basic model (2) Basic model with (3) Basic model with
across-learning only within-learning only
α0 −16.7348*** −78.2229 −5.6142**
[−4.4589] [−0.4911] [−2.1568]
αR 2.5693*** 103.279 2.3425***
[7.6483] [0.4823] [8.1898]
αv 0.4960 0.4960 0.4960
γ (absolute risk aversion) Set at 0 Set at 0 Set at 0
Q0_celebrex 2.6971*** −0.1770 −0.2610
[2.8217] [−1.0656] [−0.2746]
Q0_vioxx 2.3237** −0.0496 −0.3616
[2.3099] [−0.2453] [−0.3718]




σQ0 celebrex 0.0177*** 0.0006
[7.0597] [0.4727]
σQ0 vioxx 0.0199*** 0.0004
[7.1608] [0.4748]
σQ0 bextra 0.0294*** 0.0009
[6.7797] [0.4759]
Inverse of advertising −0.5673*** −0.6465* −0.9521***
[−2.7105] [−2.3424] [−4.3958]
Cox2 * age 0.0177*** 0.0337* 0.0174***
[13.3565] [28.6727] [12.0504]
Cox2 * sex −0.1219*** −0.1052* −0.1291***
[−2.9104] [−3.001] [−3.1486]
Cox2 * low income −0.2007*** −0.1208* −0.2033***
[−4.8697] [−3.5537] [−5.0342]
Cox2 * low education −0.0684 −0.0174 −0.0739 *
[−1.6274] [−0.5031] [−1.7888]
Cox2 * HEALTHINS −0.0015 0.0741 −0.0069
[−0.0174] [1.0262] [−0.0821]
Cox2 * INSPLAN 0.4330*** 0.674* 0.4171***
[6.5639] [12.2724] [6.3665]
Cox2 * DRUGINS −0.2277*** −0.1833* −0.1923***
[−5.3704] [−5.246] [−4.6508]
Medline article (neg) −0.7520*** −0.0555 −0.4343***
[−4.4846] [−0.5389] [−2.8955]
Medline article (non-neg) −0.9671*** −0.4621* −0.2654
[−3.511] [−7.4174] [−0.9925]
Lexis article (neg) 0.0911*** 0.0797* 0.1099***
[3.7882] [4.1067] [4.6372]
Lexis article (non-neg) 0.0173 0.0897* 0.0086
[0.7274] [4.7318] [0.362]
After FDA update −0.0803 −0.0689 0.0161
[−1.0502] [−1.1513] [0.2325]
Log likelihood −11376 −17259 −11565
# of patients 6577 6577 6577
# of prescriptions 17329 17329 17329
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This implies that prescription choice has little to do with risk preference: a
patient stays on the old prescription not because her doctor is afraid of trying
a new brand. Rather, it is probably because the patient is satisfied with the
old prescription, or because the other sources of information do not produce
any significant news against the old brand. Since including the risk parameter
prolongs estimation a great deal and all the other parameters do not change
much when we set γ = 0, we only report results that assume risk neutrality.
Three findings stand out in Table 6. First, there is significant learning from
patient satisfaction. On the one hand, the positive, significant estimate of
αR suggests that doctors believe the satisfaction reports from patients are
correlated with drug efficacy and therefore use them to update the prior. On
the other hand, the magnitudes of σQ j 0 are much smaller than both the noise
in the satisfaction report (i.e. συ) and the dispersion of patient-drug match (i.e.
σq0 ). This suggests that doctors hold strong priors about the average efficacy
of the three drugs. As a result, although they value the satisfaction reports, the
updating on the general drug quality is slow. In comparison, the learning on the
specific match between a drug and a patient is faster, because the magnitude
of σq0 is much closer to that of συ .
This interpretation is consistent with the comparison across Columns (1),
(2) and (3). The overall likelihood in Column (1) (−11376) is significantly
better than that in Columns (2) and (3) (−17259, −11565), suggesting that both
across- and within-patient learning are important in our data. However, the
likelihood (and point estimates) in Column (3) is much closer to Column (1).
This implies that a larger part of the data variation is driven by within-patient
learning, the same conclusion as we have inferred from the relative magnitudes
of σq0 , σQ j 0 , and συ . Along the same lines, we note that structural models
including within-patient learning (Columns (1) and (3)) fit the data much
better than the benchmark models in Table 5, but αR becomes insignificant
when we ignore within-patient learning in Column (2).
Coefficients corresponding to other sources of information are mixed. As
we expect, inverse of advertising is significantly negative. However, since drug
manufacturers may change advertising intensity according to predicted sales
change in the near future, this coefficient may capture some demand factor that
manufacturers observe but we do not. The concern of endogeneity prompts us
to treat advertising as a pure control and not as having any causal effect.
News articles have a positive influence on prescriptions, no matter whether
these titles sound negative or non-negative. This result is puzzling: it seems
to suggest that news articles play a greater role in informing doctors/patients
of the existence of Cox-2s rather than revealing the quality of Cox-2s. One
possible explanation is that most news are picked up by patients; when they
inquire about the drug in a doctor’s office, the doctor relies on his own
experience with the drug or his reading of professional articles, but not the
content of the news article. However this does not explain why negative news
have a larger coefficient that is more statistically significant than that of positive
news. We suspect it is either due to the measurement error in our raw data or
to the fact that many news articles in our data are negative.
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In contrast, a medical article about Cox-2s has a significant negative impact
on prescription sales, even if its title and abstract are non-negative. Note that
most of the non-negative articles are neutral, which mentions both positive
and negative effects of Cox-2s. Our findings suggest that doctors lay more
emphasis on the negative contents of Medline articles, or tend to interpret
Medline publication as a negative signal against Cox-2s. The coefficient of
FDA update is negative as we expect, but statistically indistinguishable from
zero. One possible explanation is the FDA updates lag behind Medline articles
and therefore deliver little new information to doctors.
To better understand the relative importance of information, Table 7 re-
estimates the BASIC model by excluding news reports (Column (2)) or
medical articles (Column (3)). Comparing Column (3) with the BASIC model
(results repeated in Table 7 Column (1)), we find that excluding Medline
articles does not affect the qualitative role of patient satisfaction, but it makes
the coefficient of the FDA updates much more negative than in the BASIC
model (−0.6988, with t-stat −14.97) versus −0.0803 (with t-stat −1.05). The
coefficient magnitude for advertising also increases substantially. In compari-
son, excluding news reports alone (Column (2)) produces more similar results
to the BASIC model. FDA updates seem to be a redundant follow-up from the
medical literature: once we control for Medline articles, the coefficient of FDA
updates is close to zero. But negative news articles continue to have a positive
impact on drug prescription, with or without the control of Medline articles.
This suggests that news articles (even if with negative titles) probably inform
patients about the availability of Cox-2s. Patients then bring this information
to the doctor’s notice, and this informative role is not closely correlated with
professional opinion about Cox-2s.
Comparing estimates within the three Cox-2s, we find the prior mean (Q0)
of Bextra is always smaller than that of Vioxx and Celebrex. This is consistent
with the small market share of Bextra. In all specifications, the prior dispersion
(σQ0 ) is greater for Bextra than for Celebrex and Vioxx. This finding reflects
the late entry of Bextra.
Some sensitivity occurs in the absolute magnitude of Q0: the three Q0s
are positive in the BASIC model; but when we exclude Medline articles,
they all turn negative (Table 7 Column (3)). This seemingly sensitive result is
indeed sensible: because the BASIC model controls for the number of Medline
articles in the utility function, Q0 should be interpreted as the prior mean
of a Cox-2 conditional on non-zero Medline articles. When we omit Medline
articles, the estimated Q0 represents the prior mean of a Cox-2 conditional
on its average count of Medline articles. Since most Medline articles have a
negative effect on the probability of choosing Cox-2, this explains why Q0 turns
negative if we exclude Medline articles.
The coefficients of demographics are stable across specifications. Results
suggest that older, better-income, and better educated males have a greater
tendency of receiving Cox-2. Different insurance variables have different signs:
being privately insured is associated with a greater likelihood of receiving
Cox-2, but drug insurance is negatively correlated with Cox-2 prescription.
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Table 7 Learning models with and without medical and news articles
(1) Basic model (2) Basic model with (3) Basic model with
Medline only Lexis only
α0 −16.7348*** −17.7292*** −2.2200***
[−4.4589] [−6.0502] [−2.7177]
αR 2.5693*** 2.6205*** 2.5611***
[7.6483] [8.7214] [8.0841]
αv 0.4960 0.4960 0.4960
γ (absolute risk aversion) Set at 0 Set at 0 Set at 0
Q0_celebrex 2.6971*** 2.8960*** −2.3770***
[2.8217] [2.8864] [−21.0303]
Q0_vioxx 2.3237** 2.5121** −2.3183***
[2.3099] [2.3804] [−20.3324]
Q0_bextra 2.3090** 2.4614** −2.5121***
[2.2647] [2.2928] [−20.5037]
σq0 0.3066*** 0.2979*** 0.2963***
[7.4460] [8.4998] [8.1301]
σQ0 celebrex 0.0177*** 0.0175*** 0.0122***
[7.0597] [7.7912] [7.4432]
σQ0 vioxx 0.0199*** 0.0195*** 0.0120***
[7.1608] [8.1070] [7.4906]
σQ0 bextra 0.0294*** 0.0276*** 0.0003
[6.7797] [7.5103] [1.5751]
Inverse of Advertising −0.5673*** −0.5594** −1.1450***
[−2.7105] [−2.5702] [−4.552]
Cox2 * age 0.0177*** 0.0176*** 0.0181***
[13.3565] [13.1596] [13.9286]
Cox2 * sex −0.1219*** −0.1219*** −0.1234***
[−2.9104] [−2.9018] [−3.0968]
Cox2 * low income −0.2007*** −0.1995*** −0.1974***
[−4.8697] [−4.8751] [−4.8776]
Cox2 * low education −0.0684 −0.0641 −0.0682*
[−1.6274] [−1.5144] [−1.6595]
Cox2 * HEALTHINS −0.0015 −0.0032 0.0285
[−0.0174] [−0.0377] [0.3349]
Cox2 * INSPLAN 0.4330*** 0.4323*** 0.4291***
[6.5639] [6.6111] [6.6021]
Cox2 * DRUGINS −0.2277*** −0.2252*** −0.2643***
[−5.3704] [−5.2828] [−6.5615]
Medline article (neg) −0.7520*** −0.6739***
[−4.4846] [−3.9215]
Medline article (non-neg) −0.9671*** −1.0345***
[−3.511] [−3.6034]
Lexis article (neg) 0.0911*** 0.0601**
[3.7882] [2.5662]
Lexis article (non-neg) 0.0173 −0.0112
[0.7274] [−0.4759]
After FDA update −0.0803 −0.068 −0.6988***
[−1.0502] [−0.8983] [−14.9698]
Log likelihood −11376 −11387 −11539
# of patients 6577 6577 6577
# of prescriptions 17329 17329 17329
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The latter may be explained by the non-favorable formulary status of Cox-2
relative to traditional NSAIDs. However, the potential for measurement
errors in these insurance variables suggest that we regard these variables as
pure controls rather than ascribe any specific economic meaning. All these
findings are similar to what we have seen in the benchmark models without
learning (Table 5).
Overall, results suggest that patient satisfaction, advertising, news reports
and the medical literature are all important in prescription choice. Specifically,
at the beginning of 2001 and upon the Bextra entry in January 2002, doctors
held a strong prior belief about the efficacy of Celebrex, Vioxx, and Bextra, and
learned gradually from patient satisfaction. We find evidence for both across-
and within-patient learning, but within-patient learning explains much more
variation in the data. Other sources of information are important as well: news
articles and advertising are positively correlated with prescription, but Medline
articles appear to be detrimental for drug sales. The impact of FDA updates
is close to zero once we control for Medline articles. This suggests that the
contents of FDA updates have already been included in Medline articles and
therefore deliver little new information to doctors.
5.3 Model with learning and unobserved heterogeneity
One may argue that a doctor observes more patient-specific information
than just her satisfaction before writing any prescription. Such information,
including the patient’s medical history and the nature of her demand for pain
relief, may inform the doctor about whether the patient is suitable for a specific
drug. Because we as researchers do not observe such information, we might
mis-attribute some unobserved heterogeneity to learning.










We estimate three models with random effects, the first two assume θpj
conforms to a discrete distribution that includes two or three “types” of
patients, while the third model assumes θpj is normal (N(0, σθ j), i.i.d. across
patients).19
As shown in Table 8 Columns (2) and (3), allowing two or three distinct
patient types improves the model fit a great deal (log L changes from −11376 to
−10181 and −10086) but the main results remain stable. Similar to the BASIC
19For the third model, we use simulated MLE with 20 draws.
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Table 8 Learning models with unobserved heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic Basic model Basic model Basic model
model plus 2-type plus 3-type plus normal
random effects random effects random effects
α0 −16.7348*** −16.7665** −15.062*** −10.075***
[−4.4589] [−2.3868] [−3.5513] [−2.9900]
αR 2.5693*** 2.8871*** 1.9062*** 1.7146***
[7.6483] [4.3816] [7.3826] [7.2924]
αv 0.4960 0.4960 0.4960 0.4960
γ (absolute risk aversion) Set at 0 Set at 0 Set at 0 Set at 0
Q0_celebrex 2.6971*** 1.5902 4.1650** 3.5070**
[2.8217] [1.0334] [2.4419] [2.1934]
Q0_vioxx 2.3237** 1.2475 3.7237** 3.1889*
[2.3099] [0.7738] [2.0994] [1.8939]
Q0_bextra 2.309** 1.2234 3.8992** 3.1233*
[2.2647] [0.7508] [2.1668] [1.8424]
σq0 0.3066*** 0.2748*** 0.3913*** 0.6977***
[7.4460] [4.2553] [7.0522] [5.4915]
σQ0 celebrex 0.0177*** 0.0214*** 0.0330*** 0.0557***
[7.0597] [4.1597] [6.8166] [5.3064]
σQ0 vioxx 0.0199*** 0.0243*** 0.0372*** 0.0620***
[7.1608] [4.1382] [6.8097] [5.3305]
σQ0 bextra 0.0294*** 0.0331*** 0.0491*** 0.0921***
[6.7797] [4.0741] [6.4683] [5.0416]
Inverse of advertising −0.5673*** −0.5303** −0.5321** −0.7083***
[−2.7105] [−2.3151] [−2.3092] [−2.6497]
Cox2* age 0.0177*** 0.0492*** 0.0591*** 0.0409***
[13.3565] [19.2723] [17.8998] [17.7789]
Cox2* sex −0.1219*** −0.2491*** −0.3748*** −0.2620***
[−2.9104] [−3.5346] [−4.2314] [−4.2175]
Cox2* low income −0.2007*** −0.2969*** −0.4637*** −0.2380***
[−4.8697] [−3.4475] [−3.9185] [−3.4795]
Cox2* low education −0.0684 −0.1103 −0.1254 −0.0220
[−1.6274] [−1.2236] [−1.1796] [−0.3115]
Cox2* HEALTHINS −0.0015 0.1170 0.1276 0.0999
[−0.0174] [0.6776] [0.7203] [0.7562]
Cox2* INSPLAN 0.4330*** 0.6913*** 0.8165*** 0.6453***
[6.5639] [6.1174] [6.2004] [6.5212]
Cox2* DRUGINS −0.2277*** −0.4658*** −0.2257** −0.1558**
[−5.3704] [−5.4517] [−2.1169] [−2.2431]
Medline article (neg) −0.7520*** −0.9028*** −1.1146*** −0.8561***
[−4.4846] [−3.7983] [−4.4816] [−3.2479]
Medline article (non-neg) −0.9671*** −1.2490*** −1.4297*** −1.4646***
[−3.511] [−2.8952] [−3.0832] [−3.2011]
Lexis article (neg) 0.0911*** 0.0590 0.0278 0.1308***
[3.7882] [1.5536] [0.6364] [3.1384]
Lexis article (non-neg) 0.0173 0.0177 −0.0519 −0.0011
[0.7274] [0.5646] [−1.5106] [−0.0267]
After FDA update −0.0803 −0.0607 −0.0666 −0.1233
[−1.0502] [−0.6458] [−0.6900] [−1.1698]
θ_celebrex of type 2 4.1771*** −2.7667***
[44.343] [−13.048]
θ_vioxx of type 2 3.9791*** −2.8848***
[42.811] [−14.102]
θ_bextra of type 2 4.3559*** −2.0819***
[31.646] [−6.5969]
Information, learning, and drug diffusion 433
Table 8 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic Basic model Basic model Basic model
model plus 2-type plus 3-type plus normal
random effects random effects random effects
Probability of type 1 0.5846*** 0.2731***
[48.141] [12.079]
θ_celebrex of type 3 3.3490***
[24.0066]
θ_vioxx of type 3 3.0855***
[21.7766]
θ_bextra of type 3 3.3047***
[18.506]
Probability of type 2 0.4025***
[18.9100]
σ ind-celebrex RE 2.4923***
[25.0627]
σ ind-vioxx RE 2.3108***
[25.7732]
σ ind-bextra RE 2.0277***
[17.7305]
Log likelihood −11376 −10181 −10086 −10577
# of patients 6577 6577 6577 6577
# of prescriptions 17329 17329 17329 17329
BIC 22967 20616 20465 21398
model, doctors learn from patient feedback and the learning is more within-
patient than across-patients. Inverse advertising still has a negative coefficient,
but news articles are no longer significant. In comparison, the coefficients of
medical articles remain negative and highly significant. In fact, controlling for
3 patient types increases the magnitudes of the medical article coefficients
by about 50% (as compared to the BASIC model), implying that ignoring
unobserved heterogeneity may lead to biased estimates.
The model with normal random effects (Table 8, Column (4)) produces
qualitatively similar parameter estimates and the log likelihood is worse
than what we get with two patient types. Thus, the three-patient-type model
captures most unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the BIC criterion favors
the 3-type model, too. Therefore, we denote the 3-type model as our preferred
model and use it for counterfactual simulations at the end of this section.
5.4 Robustness checks
In this subsection we discuss several robustness checks on the BASIC model.
Forward-looking behavior of physicians In contrast to several other re-
searches that have studied forward-looking behavior (Crawford and Shum
2005; Ching 2005; Erdem and Keane 1996), our model assumes that each
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doctor focuses only on the current prescription situation. We do not model
forward-looking not only because it simplifies the econometric model, but also
because of the nature of the product category that we look at. In the data, a
large proportion of patients have only one prescription and the potential risk
of malpractice is likely to prevent doctors from experimenting.20 In addition,
we carried out the following simple test and did not find evidence supporting
the forward-looking hypothesis.
Consider a risk neutral patient who is completely new to the Cox-2 category
after all three Cox-2s become available. Since Bextra is the newest member
in the category, it is by definition the least known alternative. If the patient’s
doctor is forward looking, the motivation to experiment would lead him to first
prescribe Bextra to collect information. If on the other hand the prescription
is driven by what the doctor has already learned about the drug quality, then
he is more likely to prescribe either of the two older drugs that on average
have greater posterior mean quality than Bextra. Indeed, among 1,255 such
new patients, only 200 were given Bextra as their first prescription while the
remaining majority were prescribed either Celebrex or Vioxx.
Therefore, we believe that although experimentation might be relevant for
some product categories, it is unlikely to be a key issue for our study. We will
leave the possibility of studying forward-looking behavior for future research.
Sampling weights While our data contain a nationally representative sample
of households, we do not observe the whole population. In reality, doctors may
use the experience of all patients to form beliefs about drug quality. Intuitively,
ignoring part of the population tends to miss part of the across-patient learning
and therefore mis-characterize the importance of across- and within-patient
learning.
To address this issue, we make use of sampling weights that are available
to us in the data.21 If individual A has a sampling weight of 100, we assume
doctors (in A’s Census division) observe 100 patients whose demographics,
prescription history, and satisfaction index are identical to A’s. By this assump-
tion, we inflate the individual records by sampling weights and then re-estimate
the BASIC model. Statistically speaking, this is equivalent to asserting that,
when doctors summarize patient feedback into the posterior belief, they assign
more importance to the patients who represent more of the population in our
original data.
20The fear of malpractice is not necessarily inconsistent with risk neutrality. A risk neutral doctor
will try to avoid malpractice if it implies large compensation or end of his/her career.
21IPSOS has a sophisticated program that assigns weights to panelists. The weights change with
time. So we obtained weights for the time period that is relevant for our study. These weights
reflect the overall representativeness of each panelist during a specific time period.
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Results incorporating sampling weight are presented in Table 9 Column
(2).22 Compared with the unweighted results (Table 9 Column (1)), adding
sampling weights does not change qualitative conclusions: αR is still positive
and highly significant, implying that doctors learn from patient feedback. Like
before, estimated σq0 is much larger than the three σQ0 . This indicates that
the prior of patient-drug match is more dispersed than the prior of average
drug quality, hence doctors learn faster within a patient than across patients.
In fact, adding sampling weights enlarges the difference between σq0 and
σQ0 , which suggests that our unweighted results may even underestimate the
importance of within-patient learning. This change is intuitive because across-
patient learning is identified from prescription correlations across different
patients. When we inflate the data by sampling weights, we attenuate the
observed correlation among a greater population, which reduces the amount
of learning obtained from each single patient. Parameters on demographics
and the other information variables hardly change. Since the log likelihood
(−11375) is extremely similar to what we get from the unweighted model
(−11376), we are confident that our main results (unweighted) are robust to
including sampling weights.
Functional form of advertising In the BASIC model, we use the inverse
of total cumulative advertising, which entails three assumptions: first, drug
diffusion follows a reciprocal model as dictated by the inverse of advertising;
second, advertising does not depreciate over time; third, different forms of
advertising are pooled together.
Strictly speaking, all three assumptions are subject to question. Since any
functional form of advertising is arbitrary, we re-estimate the BASIC model
with many alternative specifications: (1) using advertising or log advertising
instead of the inverse; (2) using detailing and DTCA separately instead of the
total of detailing, journal advertising and DTCA; (3) using flow of advertising
instead of the cumulative sum; (4) estimating monthly depreciation rates for
detailing and DTCA; and (5) lagging advertising by 3,6,9 and 12 months.
Across these specifications, the qualitative results on all the non-advertising
variables are similar to what we had before, but the coefficient(s) on advertis-
ing is sensitive to specifications. As shown in Table 9 Column (3), when we
include log(detailing) and log(DTCA) separately, both coefficients are signifi-
cant but detailing is positive while DTCA is negative. We suspect the negative
sign of DTCA is due to endogenous determination of DTCA or omitted vari-
able bias. In theory, the same concern exists for any other type of advertising.
Because we do not have valid instruments to control for such endogeneity,
22We are able to obtain sampling weights for only a subset of individuals in our data. We use two
steps to impute the missing weights. First, focusing on the individuals that have sampling weights,
we regress the reported weights on a polynomial function of demographic variables and whether
the studied individual has returned the diary on a regular basis. In the second step, we use the
predicted relationship to predict sampling weights for the rest of the sample. Results reported in
Table 9 are based on the imputed weights.
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Table 9 Robustness check on sampling weights and advertising
(1) (2) (3)
Basic model Basic model plus Basic model using
sampling weights alternative adv.
α0 −16.7348*** −16.8017*** −19.2098***
[−4.4589] [−7.4687] [−3.9187]
αR 2.5693*** 2.5797*** 2.6403***
[7.6483] [11.9663] [6.1506]
αv 0.4960 0.4960 0.4960
γ (absolute risk aversion) Set at 0 Set at 0 Set at 0
Q0_celebrex 2.6971*** 2.7038*** 3.3535***
[2.8217] [4.7383] [2.9303]
Q0_vioxx 2.3237** 2.3324*** 3.2387***
[2.3099] [3.9314] [2.7111]
Q0_bextra 2.309** 2.3078*** 2.4873***
[2.2647] [3.7378] [1.1891]
σq0 0.3066*** 0.3063*** 0.2910***
[7.4460] [13.1666] [6.0368]
σQ0 celebrex 0.0177*** 0.0066*** 0.0170***
[7.0597] [9.8280] [5.8207]
σQ0 vioxx 0.0199*** 0.0075*** 0.0185***
[7.1608] [10.0908] [5.8224]
σQ0 bextra 0.0294*** 0.0111*** 0.0265***
[6.7797] [9.5648] [5.4660]
Inverse of advertising −0.5673*** −0.5655***
[−2.7105] [−2.8889]
Log total detailing 0.2486**
[2.1864]
Log total DTCA −0.1704***
[−4.6389]
Cox2 * age 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 0.0177***
[13.3565] [13.2926] [13.2303]
Cox2 * sex −0.1219*** −0.1217*** −0.1191***
[−2.9104] [−2.8713] [−2.8355]
Cox2 * low income −0.2007*** −0.2007*** −0.2042***
[−4.8697] [−4.8256] [−4.9374]
Cox2 * low education −0.0684 −0.0677 −0.0667
[−1.6274] [−1.5916] [−1.5834]
Cox2 * HEALTHINS −0.0015 −0.0011 0.0062
[−0.0174] [−0.013] [0.0717]
Cox2 * INSPLAN 0.433*** 0.4331*** 0.4294***
[6.5639] [6.5698] [6.4765]
Cox2 * DRUGINS −0.2277*** −0.2276*** −0.2293***
[−5.3704] [−5.272] [−5.3778]
Medline article (neg) −0.752*** −0.7481*** −0.5583***
[−4.4846] [−6.0478] [−2.9170]
Medline article −0.9671*** −0.9683*** −1.3000***
[−3.511] [−5.9626] [−4.0813]
Lexis article (neg) 0.0911*** 0.0903*** 0.1709***
[3.7882] [3.7466] [4.4297]
Lexis article (non-neg) 0.0173 0.0178 0.0277
[0.7274] [0.7513] [1.1587]
After FDA update −0.0803 −0.0811 −0.1296*
[−1.0502] [−1.0566] [−1.6721]
Log likelihood −11376 −11375 −11367
# of prescriptions 17329 17329 17329
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we treat advertising as a control and do not interpret its coefficient as having a
causal effect. Fortunately, the effects of all the other variables are stable across
specifications. Since these non-advertising variables are beyond the control of
drug manufacturers, they are immune from reverse causality.
Patient demographics Strictly speaking, patient demographics may play two
roles in prescription decisions: first, doctors may have a fixed view of drugs
that match best with various demographic characteristics. To fully account for
such practice, we should allow the coefficients of each patient’s demographics
(βxj) to vary by brand for each of the 4 alternatives, instead of Cox-2s versus
traditional NSAIDs. Given the large number of demographics included in the
basic model, we estimate brand-specific βxj on the demographic variable that
has the most predictive power in prescription decision—patient age. The re-
estimated basic model does not show much improvement in the likelihood
(from −11376 to −11374) and the magnitude of the age coefficient is similar
across the three Cox-2 brands. At the same time, results on all the information
variables remain unchanged.
Another channel for patient demographics to influence prescription deci-
sions is through the learning structure. It is not difficult to see that doctors may
be more likely to apply the experience of elderly male patients to other elderly
males than to young females. However, it is extremely difficult to account for
demographic-specific learning in the structural model, because some key de-
mographic variables are continuous (say age) and any demographic grouping
seems arbitrary. Keeping this caveat in mind, we emphasize that the learning
estimates presented in this paper represent the average amount of learning
across all demographic groups.
Medline articles The negative coefficient on non-negative medline articles
is counterintuitive. To better understand the statistical forces underlying this
coefficient, we conduct a number of robustness checks.
First, we re-estimate the basic model by decomposing the non-negative
medline articles into positive and neutral articles. Results suggest that the
negative coefficient of non-negative articles is primarily driven by a negative
response to positive articles. Once we control for positive articles separately,
the response to neutral articles becomes positive but insignificant with 95%
confidence level.
To address the suspicion that doctors may view a positive article from a
pharmaceutical company employee as a negative signal, we conduct a second
robustness check by including variables for author affiliation. Results suggest
a strong negative response to company affiliation and including affiliation
reduces the significance of the responses to positive/negative/neutral articles.
In comparison, including variables describing whether an article focuses on
efficacy or side effects generate very noisy results. Among a number of
specifications we have tried, only in one case do we observe negative and
significant response to side-effects articles. The efficacy indicator is never
significant.
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Table 10 Model fit: % of correct prediction of the actual RX choice
Discrete choice Basic Basic, Basic, Basic + 3
model without model within-patient across-patient patient-types
learning structure learning only learning only (preferred)
61.17% 78.96% 78.35% 60.58% 85.49%
(based on the estimation sample of 17,329 RXs)
We suspect many of the noisy results are driven by the high correlations
across the different sets of variables: for example, company-affiliated articles
are more likely to be positive and positive articles are more likely to focus on
efficacy instead of side effects. Thus including all of them in one specification is
likely to generate a collinearity problem. Given that all the other information
variables do not change much when we try different specifications on the
medline articles, we believe the basic model is a reasonable simplification.
5.5 Model fit and counterfactual predictions
This subsection examines the relative importance of different sources of
information. Treating the BASIC model with 3-patient-type random effects
(Table 8 Column (3)) as our preferred model, we predict the number of
prescriptions for three scenarios and compare them with the actual data.
The first scenario is our preferred model, which takes all sources of in-
formation as given and reports the predicted prescription counts by drug-
month. This scenario indicates a good fit to the data: As shown in Table 10,
for each of the 17,329 prescriptions considered in our estimation sample,
we are able to predict the actual prescription choice correctly 85.5% of the
time. In comparison, the percentage of correct prediction is 61.2% for the
logit model without learning structure, 79.0% for the basic model, 78.4% for
the basic model with within-patient learning only, and 60.6% for the basic
model with across-patient learning only. Another measure of model fit is
the percent of market share deviations from the actual data. Taking month-
drug as the unit of observation, our preferred model has an average absolute
percentage deviation of 26.5% if we focus on the prediction of Cox-2s, or
20.7% if the calculation includes non-Cox2s.23 This suggests that, on average,
our prediction of a Cox-2’s monthly market share deviates from its actual share
by 26.5%.
The second scenario assumes that patient feedback is shared nationwide
instead of within a census division. This scenario reflects a recent proposal
of FDA setting up a nationwide database to share patient feedback among
doctors (Slater 2005). Since the satisfaction signals are observed, this coun-
terfactual experiment can be easily implemented by allowing every patient to
23For each month-drug, absolute percentage deviation is defined as abs(predicted number of
RX—actual number of RX) / actual number of RX. We then average this index across all month-
drugs for each Cox-2 (which yields 26.5%) or for all four drugs (which yields 20.7%).
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learn from everyone else in the data set, as opposed to only from those in the
same geographic area. The third scenario assumes double counts of medical
articles. This may be achieved by, e.g., subsidizing journal subscription, mailing
a summary of academic findings to doctor office, or encouraging pharmacists
and other health care professionals to educate doctors in an office visit.
Readers can also interpret the last scenario as a greater intensity of “academic
detailing”, which has been proposed as a potential improvement in FDA’s
post-marketing surveillance (Ray and Stein 2006). In addition to mimicking
proposals for the FDA reform, these two scenario also allow us to compare the
effects of learning from individual patient satisfaction versus reading academic
publications. These two are not readily comparable in the reported coefficients
because one is modeled as Bayesian updating but the other enters the utility
function directly.
It is important to realize the limitation of our counterfactual experiments.
As implied by the data collection process, our patient diary data are likely to
capture the effects that are easily observable to patients (such as pain relief,
stomach upset or skin irritation) but not life-threatening events like likely
heart attack. For this reason, predictions generated from our second scenario
do not fully capture the actual effects of pooling all patient feedbacks in a
nationwide database. To the extent that some patient experience, especially
heart attacks and other severe events, are reported in academic articles,
nationwide pooling of information may be translated into a greater intensity of
academic dissemination, which is partly captured in the third scenario. Lastly,
all of our empirical model focuses on a specific drug class (NSAIDs) in a
specific time period (2001–2003), and therefore conclusions drawn from the
counterfactual experiments are not necessarily applicable to other drugs and
other time.
Comparing the two hypothetical scenarios against the actual data, Table 11
reports the predicted percentage change in the market share of Celebrex,
Vioxx, Bextra and non-Cox2s from January 2001 to December 2003. Ex-
panding census division learning to the national level makes a big difference:
because patients report higher satisfaction for Celebrex than for Vioxx, Bextra,
or traditional NSAIDs (see summary in Table 3), a nationwide database en-
courages switching towards Cox-2 inhibitors. The percentage change of market
share is the lowest for Celebrex because Celebrex has the largest sales among
the three Cox-2 inhibitors. The effect of more Medline publications is opposite
to pooling patient feedback: compared to the actual market shares, doubling
Table 11 Counterfactuals
Counterfactual scenarios % change in the market share of
Celebrex Vioxx Bextra All others
#1: Nationwide sharing of 15.01% 20.82% 21.05% −10.74%
patient feedbacks
#2: Double academic articles −30.44% −25.36% −27.11% 17.03%
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Medline articles would increase the market share of traditional NSAIDs by
17.03%, while depressing the market share of Cox-2 inhibitors by 25–30%.
6 Conclusions
Acquiring information about drug efficacy is not only at the center of FDA
regulations, but also the key element driving each prescription decision in
doctor’s office. Using a unique data set from patient diaries, we estimate how
patient satisfaction and other factors affect the diffusion of Cox-2 inhibitors
from 2001 to 2003. Our results suggest that prescription choice is sensitive to
many sources of information, including patient satisfaction, Medline articles,
news report and manufacturer advertising. In comparison, the impact of FDA
updates is close to zero once we control for Medline articles. This suggests that
the contents of FDA updates have already been included in Medline articles
and therefore deliver no new information to doctors. This also confirms the
view that FDA postmarketing surveillance lags behind the medical literature
and has room to improve.
According to our counterfactual predictions, setting up a nationwide
database of patient feedback encourages doctors to switch from traditional
NSAIDs to Cox-2s, but increasing Medline publications about Cox-2s steals
market share away from Cox-2s. This suggests that patient feedback and
academic articles may reflect different dimensions of drug quality, and
these two sources of information do not necessarily substitute for each
other.
Despite our efforts devoted at gathering every piece of information about
Cox-2, our results are subject to several limitations: first of all, the patient diary
data do not contain doctor identities and only represents a sample of all the
Cox-2 patients. Both tend to undermine our ability to precisely estimate how
doctors learn across patients. Second, our patient satisfaction data are self-
reported. This does not necessarily generate a specific bias as compared to the
patients’ real experiences, but it does put more weight on the symptoms that
patients can observe easily and care to report to their doctors. Third, although
our model of patient-drug match already incorporates heterogeneity reflected
in the satisfaction data, it is possible that there remain some patient attributes
observable to doctors but not to researchers. We use patient-drug random
effects to control for such unobserved heterogeneity, but we might still be
ignoring some sources of heterogeneity. Finally, manufacturers may advertise
more in a period that they expect to have low sales, thus introducing an
endogeneity problem. This suggests that the coefficients of advertising should
be interpreted as the correlation between advertising and prescription choice,
rather than as having a causal impact.
In summary, this is a first attempt at using actual consumer (or patient)
feedback information in the context of a learning model. Future research
can look at including other sources of information within the formal learning
framework proposed here.
Information, learning, and drug diffusion 441
Acknowledgements We wish to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for constructive
comments and suggestions. We also thank Simon Anderson, John Chao, Andrew Ching, Greg
Crawford, Tülin Erdem, Phillip Leslie, Jackie Luan, Puneet Manchanda, Sean Nicholson, Peter
Reiss, Jesse Shapiro, Vishal Singh, Russ Winer, Marta Wosinska, seminar attendees at the
University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, and New York University, as well as the
participants at the 2006 American Society of Health Economists Conference, the 2007 Conference
on Empirical IO, the 2007 International Industrial Organization Conference, and the 2007
Quantitative Marketing and Economics Conference. Research assistance from Yan Chen is greatly
appreciated. All errors remain ours.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix: Formula for the posterior variance of ˜Q pjt





from the elements in −1. Since ˜Qpjt = ˜Q jt + q˜pjt, in order to compute the
variance of ˜Qpjt, we need to first obtain the variances of ˜Q jt and q˜pjt (diagonals
of ), as well as the covariance between them (first row of  ). As stated in the
paper, −1 is the natural product in deriving the Normal posterior density. We
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